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Abstract. Uniquely identifying individuals across the various networks
they interact with on a daily basis remains a challenge for the digital
world that we live in, and therefore the development of secure and effi-
cient privacy preserving identity mechanisms has become an important
field of research. In addition, the popularity of decentralised decision
making networks such as Bitcoin has seen a huge interest in making use
of distributed ledger technology to store and securely disseminate end
user identity credentials. In this paper we describe a mechanism that
allows one to store the COVID-19 vaccination details of individuals on
a publicly readable, decentralised, immutable blockchain, and makes use
of a two-factor authentication system that employs biometric crypto-
graphic hashing techniques to generate a unique identifier for each user.
Our main contribution is the employment of a provably secure input-
hiding, locality-sensitive hashing algorithm over an iris extraction tech-
nique, that can be used to authenticate users and anonymously locate
vaccination records on the blockchain, without leaking any personally
identifiable information to the blockchain.
Keywords: blockchain, identity, biometric, privacy, locality-sensitive hashing
1 Introduction
The current COVID-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the urgent need
for a “passport” like instrument, which can be used to easily identify a user’s
vaccination record, travel history etc., as they traverse the globe. However given
the large number of potential users of such a system and the involvement of
many organizations in different jurisdictions, we need to design a system that is
easy to sign up for end users, and for it to be rolled out at a rapid rate.
This work was supported, in part, by Science Foundation Ireland grant 13/RC/2094
and co-funded under the European Regional Development Fund through the South-
ern & Eastern Regional Operational Programme to Lero - the Science Foundation
Ireland Research Centre for Software (www.lero.ie)
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The use of hardware devices such as smart cards or mobile phones for storing
such data is going to be financially prohibitive for many users, especially those
in developing countries. Also, past experience has shown that such “hardware
tokens” are sometimes prone to design flaws that only come to light once a large
number of the tokens are in circulation. Such flaws usually require remedial
action in terms of software or hardware updates, which can prove to be very
disruptive and costly.
An alternative to the above dilemma is an online passport mechanism. An
obvious choice for the implementation of such a system is a blockchain, that
provides a “decentralized immutable ledger” which can be configured in a man-
ner such that it can be only written to by authorised entities (i.e. there is no
requirement for a hard computation such as proof-of-work (PoW) to be carried
out for monetary reward), but can be queried by anyone. However, one of the
main concerns for such a system is based around the question of: How does one
preserve the privacy of user data on a public blockchain, while providing a ro-
bust mechanism to be able to securely link users to their data records? In other
words, one of the key requirements is to avoid having any personally identifiable
information (PII) belonging to users stored on the blockchain.
2 System Overview
In this section we provide a high-level overview of our system before delving into
the technical details. Our proposed system makes use of a two-factor authen-
tication mechanism to uniquely identify an individual on the blockchain. The
parameters required to recreate an identifier is based on information that “one
knows” and biometric information that “one possess”.
Fig. 1: Blockchain Structure
When a user presents themselves to an organization participating in the
system, such as a hospital, primary care center, GP clinic etc., that has the
authority to add transactions to the blockchain, they are asked for their DoB
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(dd/mm/yyyy) and Gender (male/female/other) details. In addition, the or-
ganization captures a number of scans of the user’s iris, and creates a hash
H1(Scan) from the “best” biometric scan data.
3 Our system then generates an
unique 256-bit identifier (ID) for the user:
ID = H2(DoB || Gender || H1(Scan)) (1)
If the user is presenting to the system for the first time, then a hash of the
user’s iris scan data i.e. H1(Scan) is stored as an anonymous transaction on the
blockchain. As we can see in Figure 1, there are three anonymous transactions
(i.e. Hash of Scan Data) stored on the blockchain pertaining to three different
users. The reader is referred to Section 4 for more details on how the hash is
calculated in our system. Note that the storage of the anonymous hash data has
to be carried only once per registered user in the system. A secondary transaction
which consists of the derived ID and the user’s vaccination record is also stored
separately on the blockchain. Figure 1 shows a blockchain in which there are
three COVID-19 vaccination record transactions on the blockchain pertaining
three different users.
Fig. 2: Algorithm Workflow
3 It is important to note that the organization does not store any PII on its systems.
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Figure 2 describes the overall algorithm that we employ in our proposed
system. When a user presents themselves to an entity or organisation running
the service, they are asked for their DoB and Gender, and to provide an iris
scan (Scan). The system creates a hash H1(Scan) out of the “best” biometric
data out of a few scans that it takes of the user’s iris. The algorithm then tries
to match the calculated hash H1(Scan) with existing “anonymous” hashes that
are stored on the blockchain. It may get back a set of hashes that are somewhat
“close” to the calculated hash. In that case the algorithm concatenates each
returned hash (Matchi) with the user’s DoB and Gender to produce I˜D. It
then tries to match I˜D with an ID in a vaccination record transaction on the
blockchain.
If a match is found then the user is already registered on the system and has
a vaccination record. At this point we may just wish to retrieve the record or add
an additional record for the user, e.g. when a booster dose has been administered
to the user. However if we go through the set of returned matches and cannot
match I˜D to an existing ID in a vaccination record on the blockchain, i.e. this is
the first time the user is presenting to the service, then we store the iris scan hash
data H1(Scan) as an anonymous record on the blockchain, and subsequently the
ID and COVID-19 vaccination details for the user as a separate transaction. In
each case the transaction is broadcast at a random interval on the blockchain
peer-to-peer (P2P) network for it to be verified by other nodes in the system,
and for it to be eventually added to a block to the blockchain. Uploading the two
transactions belonging to a user at random intervals ensures that the transactions
are stored on separate blocks on the blockchain, and an attacker is not easily
able to identify the relationship between the two.
In the subsequent sections we describe some of the key components of our
system and the motivation that led us to use them. The three major components
are - extraction of iris templates, a hashing mechanism to store them securely
and a blockchain technology. Before presenting each of these components, we
will briefly discuss some related work.
2.1 Related Work
There has been considerable work on biometric cryptosystems and cancellable
biometrics, which aims to protect biometric data when stored for the purpose of
authentication cf. [11]. Biometric hashing is one such approach that can achieve
the desired property of irreversibility, albeit without salting (we need some user-
specific information for this) it does not achieve unlinkability4. Research in bio-
metric hashing for generating the same hash for different biometric templates
4 Our system also does not achieve unlinkability, the property whereby the stored data
pertaining to the biometric, which in our case is a Locality-sensitive hash (LSH), if
generated multiple times for the same user should not make it possible to determine
that they belong to the same user. This is not an important property in our context
since it is unlikely we need to support revocation and re-enrollment of a user in the
context of vaccination records. Furthermore, we want to avoid keys and passwords.
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from the same user is at an infant stage and existing work does not provide
strong security assurances. Locality-sensitive hashing is the approach we explore
in this paper, which has been applied to biometrics in existing work; for example
a recent paper by Dang et al. [3] applies a variant of SimHash, a hash function we
use in this paper, to face templates. However the technique of applying locality-
sensitive hashing to a biometric template has not been employed, to the best of
our knowledge, in a system such as ours.
3 Iris Template Extraction
Iris biometrics is considered as one of the most reliable techniques for implement-
ing identification systems. For the ID of our system, we needed an algorithm
that can provide us with consistent iris templates, which will have not only low
intra-class variability, but also show high inter-class variability. This requirement
is essential because we would expect the iris templates for the same subject to be
similar, as this would then be hashed using the technique described in the section
4. Iris based biometric techniques have received some good attention in the last
decade. One of the most successful technique was put forward by John Daug-
man [4], but most of the current best-in-class techniques are patented and hence
unavailable for an open-source use. For the purpose of writing this paper, we
have used the work by Libor Masek [6] which is an open-source implementation
of a reasonably reliable iris recognition technique. Users can always opt for other
commercial biometric solutions when trying to deploy our work independently.
Masek’s technique worked for grey-scale eye images, which were processed
in order to extract the binary template. At first, the segmentation algorithm,
based on a Hough Transform is used to localise the iris and pupil regions and
also isolate the eyelid, eyelash and reflections as shown in Figures 3a and 3b.
The segmented iris region is then normalised i.e, unwrapped into a rectangular
block of constant polar dimensions as shown in Figure 3c. The iris features are
extracted from the normalised image by one-dimensional Log-Gabor filters to
produce a bit-wise iris template and mask as shown in Figure 3d. This data is
then used for matching, where the Hamming distance is used as the matching
metric. We have used CASIA-Iris-Interval database [2] in Figure 3 and for some
preliminary testing.
Table 1 shows the performance of Masek’s technique as reported by him in his
original thesis [7]. This algorithm performs quite well for a threshold of 0.4 where
the false acceptance rate (FAR) is 0.005 and the false rejection rate (FRR) is 0.
These values are used when we present our results to compare the performance
of our technique when a biometric template is first hashed and then the FAR and
FRR are measured by hamming distances, as opposed to directly measuring the
hamming distances in the original biometric templates. One would assume the
performance of our work to get better with the increase in efficiency of extracting
consistent biometric templates by other methods.
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(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 3: Masek’s Iris Template Extraction Algorithm
4 Locality-sensitive Hashing
To preserve the privacy of individuals on the blockchain, the biometric data has
to be encrypted before being written to the ledger. Hashing is a good alternative
to achieve this, but techniques such as SHA-256 and SHA-3 cannot be used, since
the biometric templates that we extracted above can show differences across
various scans for the same individual. Hence using those hash functions would
produce completely different hashes. The original motivation for using Locality-
sensitive hashing (LSH) was to be generate “similar” hashes for similar biometric
templates. Various LSH techniques had been researched to identify that files (i.e.
byte streams) are similar based on their hashes. Below we assess two approaches
to locality-sensitive hashing.
4.1 TLSH
An open-source algorithm for LSH is TLSH - Trend Micro Locality Sensitive
Hash [9]. We believe that this hashing mechanism can be used on the biometric
templates to generate similar hashes which can then be written to the ledger.
In TLSH, the input byte stream is processed using a sliding window of length
5 to populate the buckets. At each step, 6 triplets (out of a total of 10 possible
triplets) are fed into the Pearson hashing function [10] which is used as a bucket
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Threshold FAR FRR
0.20 0.000 74.046
0.25 0.000 45.802
0.30 0.000 25.191
0.35 0.000 4.580
0.40 0.005 0.000
0.45 7.599 0.000
0.50 99.499 0.000
Table 1: FAR and FRR for the CASIA-a Data Set
mapping function. The bucket corresponding to the value we get from that func-
tion is incremented. Finally after the entire byte stream is traversed, quartile
points (q1, q2 and q3) are calculated using the bucket values. We determine a
2 bit result for each of the buckets depending upon the value v it stores - 00 if
v <= q1, else 01 if v <= q2, else 10 if v <= q3, else 11. The final hash value is
the concatenation of an additional header and all these individual outputs.
If one of the bytes from the input stream is changed, it will affect the values
of 18 buckets at maximum. However, since the final hash is calculated using
quartiles, the effect will not be seen on all of the 36 bits (i.e. 2 bits each from each
of those 18 buckets). When the change in input stream is larger, but localised,
the total effect on the final hash per byte of input change is drastically reduced.
This allows TLSH (and similar digest hashes) to be used for identification of
spam emails and malware analysis when the input data is quite similar. This
would also serve our purpose as is evident from the results.
Security The TLSH hash function is not a cryptographically strong algorithm.
It was not designed with security applications in mind. This is of considerable
concern to us in this work as we need to ensure that the privacy of a user’s
sensitive iris template is upheld, and in particular, that given a TLSH output
hash, it is infeasible for an adversary to reveal information about the input to
the hash. At present, until a more thorough analysis of TLSH from a security
perspective is conducted, our choice of TLSH for our system is provisional and
comes with important caveats.
In fact, such apparent limitations inform a valuable direction for future
work, namely an exploration of hash functions that offer both cryptographic
strength and locality preservation while remaining practical. Immediately, there
appears to be a severe impediment to achieving both simultaneously, which is
that the strict avalanche criterion exemplifying the desired diffusion property of
a cryptographically-strong hash function is explicitly violated in accommodat-
ing locality preservation. On the other hand, our application in this paper does
not require all of the properties typically demanded of a crytographically-secure
hash function such as second-preimage resistance and collision resistance.
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Fig. 4: Overview of the TLSH Mechanism
Specifically, the sought-after property here is a variant of preimage resistance
i.e. that it is hard to find an input that hashes to a given hash value. This is
because we restrict ourselves to an adversarial model where the adversary is not
permitted access to partial information about a user’s iris template, which mod-
els the information gleaned by an attacker from scrutiny of the public blockchain
records and the hash outputs therein. We also do not want the attacker to learn
partial information about the input to the hash function (i.e. the iris template),
even if it remains computationally intractable to recover the preimage in its en-
tirety. In fact, we do not require the hash function to be one-way. This is because
in the cryptographic definition of one-way functions, it is required that it is hard
to find any preimage of the function. However, we can relax our requirements
here because it does not matter if for example a random preimage can be com-
puted, as long as it is hard to find the specific preimage that was actually used
in our application (i.e. the user’s iris template). Precisely, the required security
property is input hiding, defined in the next section.
Let us consider how a possible attack on TLSH would proceed with the
objective of computing some partial information about the input, given just the
hash h. We can achieve a lot with some precomputation using a brute-force
approach for all n-bit combinations, where n is a “small” integer denoting the
length of the bit sequence whose appearance in the input we wish to determine.
Suppose we have n = 24, i.e. a triplet of bytes. We can apply Pearson and find
the buckets for every n-bit combination. By looking at the two-bit designations
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for each bucket contained in the hash h, we can estimate how likely it is that
the selected n-bit combination appears in the input. However, since there are a
great many preimages that map to the same bucket, we can only make rough
predictions. Immediately, for example, the absence of the n-bit combination or
its relative infrequency in the input is evident from a low value corresponding
to the associated bucket.
However, we can only establish a likelihood for the occurrence of the n-
bit combination in the input; in particular, we strictly cannot determine the
positions in the input these n-bit combinations occur. Nevertheless, we have
identified a crude method to reveal certain partial information about the input.
While this immediately precludes TLSH from being employed in general security
applications, if we restrict ourselves to the specialized context of this work, we
see that this approach might not be successful in revealing sensitive information
about a user’s iris template, although further investigation is needed to make firm
conclusions. We concede that the cryptanalytic endeavor in this section is brief
and cursory, we invite the community to conduct further cryptanalysis on the
preimage resistance of TLSH. For the moment, strong security assurances cannot
be made with respect to TLSH. Instead what we have is heuristic security. As
such, TLSH is a candidate locality-sensitive hash function in relation to security.
4.2 SimHash
Another method we can adopt is random projection hashing, proposed by Charikar
[1], which preserves the cosine distance between two vectors in the output of the
hash, such that two hashes are probabilistically similar depending on the cosine
distance between the two preimage vectors. The hash function is called SimHash.
We describe a slight variant of SimHash here. Suppose we choose a hash length
of ` bits. Now for our purposes, the input vectors to the hash are binary vectors
in {0, 1}n for some n. Then first we choose ` random vectors ri←$ {−1, 0, 1}n
for i ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Let R = {ri}i∈{1,...,`} be the set of these random vectors. The
hash function HR : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` is defined thus:
HR(x) = (sgn(〈x, r1〉), . . . , sgn(〈x, r`〉)) (2)
where sgn : Z→ {0, 1} returns 0 if its integer argument is negative and returns
1 otherwise. Note that the notation 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product between
the two specified vectors. Let x1,x2 ∈ {0, 1}n be two input vectors. It holds
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `} that Pr[h(1)i = h(2)i ] = 1 − θ(x1,x2)pi where h(1) = HR(x1),
h(2) = HR(x2) and θ(x1,x2) is the angle between x1 and x2. Therefore the
similarity of the inputs is preserved in the similarity of the hashes.
An important question is: Is this hash function suitable for our application?
The answer is in the affirmative because irrespective of the fact that the function
is trivially invertible using linear algebra, and therefore not one-way, it can be
proved that the function information-theoretically obeys a weaker but sufficient
property we call input-hiding. The notion of input hiding means that if we choose
some binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}n and give the hash h = HR(x) to an adversary,
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it is either computationally hard or information-theoretically impossible (as we
have here) for the adversary to learn x or any partial information about x. This
property is sufficient in our application since we only have to ensure that no
information is leaked about the user’s iris template.
5 Blockchain Technology
A blockchain is used in the system for immutable storage of vaccination records
of individuals. The blockchain we employ is a permissioned ledger to which
blocks can only be added by authorized entities or persons such as hospitals,
primary health care centers, clinicians etc. Such entities have to obtain a public-
key certificate from a trusted third party and store it on the blockchain as a
transaction before they are allowed to add blocks to the ledger. The opportunity
to add a new block is controlled in a round robin fashion, thereby eliminating
the need to perform a computationally intensive PoW process. Any transactions
that are broadcast to the P2P network are signed by the entity that created the
transaction, and can be verified by all other nodes by downloading the public key
of the signer from the ledger itself. An example of distributed ledger technology
that fulfills the above requirements is MultiChain [8].
6 Future Work
A natural direction for future work is to conduct a thorough analysis of Locality-
sensitive hashing in security applications. In this work, we argue that the tech-
nique of random projection which has provable security for our requirements
should be preferred over a candidate LSH such as TLSH, which has only heuris-
tic security. A more in-depth analysis of TLSH from a security perspective is a
potential avenue of future work. Our system also does not achieve unlinkability,
the property whereby the stored data pertaining to the biometric, which in our
case is the LSH hash, if generated multiple times for the same user should not
make it possible to determine that they belong to the same user. This is im-
portant for revocability and then later renewability (when the user enrolls again
after revocation), which our system can support but in a transparent manner
that reveals the revocation and renewal of the user. Keeping this information
private is another direction for future work. However since our application is
medical and would be unlikely that someone would wish to revoke vaccination
records, it is not particularly a high-priority feature.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have detailed a framework to build a global vaccination passport
using a distributed ledger. The main contribution of our work is to combine a
Locality-sensitive hashing mechanism with a blockchain to store the vaccination
records of users. The SimHash LSH function is used to derive an identifier that
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leaks no personal information about an individual. The only way to extract a
user record from the blockchain is by the user presenting themselves in person to
an authorised entity, and providing an iris scan along with other personal data
in order to drive the correct user identifier.
The blockchain based mechanism that we have proposed can also be used
as generalised healthcare management system [5, 12] with the actual data be-
ing stored off-chain for purposes of efficiency. Once the user identifier has been
recreated it can be used to pull all records associated with the identifier, thereby
creating the full medical history of an individual. As detailed in Section 6 we
are in the middle of developing a prototype implementation of the system and
hope to present the results of our evaluation in a follow-on paper. At some time
in the future, we hope to trial the system in the field, with the hope of rolling it
out on a larger scale.
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